

One Nation, One Election in India: A Constitutional Feasibility Analysis

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Abstract: *The proposal for “One Nation, One Election” (ONOE) has re-emerged as a major theme in debates on electoral reform in India. This article examines whether a constitutionally designed framework for simultaneous elections to the House of the People and the State Legislative Assemblies is legally feasible, institutionally workable and normatively defensible within India’s parliamentary federal order. The article argues that the proposal cannot be evaluated only in terms of political preference or administrative convenience; it must be tested against constitutional text, the basic structure doctrine, the logic of parliamentary responsibility and the practical realities of electoral governance. Drawing on the High-Level Committee on Simultaneous Elections, earlier reports of the Law Commission of India and the Parliamentary Standing Committee and recent academic and policy literature, the article identifies the principal constitutional provisions that would require amendment and examines the associated concerns relating to federalism, democratic accountability, premature dissolution and voter behaviour. The article concludes that ONOE is constitutionally feasible in principle, but only if it is implemented through a carefully limited amendment package, broad-based political consultation, safeguards for state autonomy and a transitional model that avoids disproportionate extension or curtailment of legislative terms. A two-cycle or phased synchronisation model may offer a more prudent path than an all-at-once restructuring. The article therefore treats ONOE neither as an inherent constitutional threat nor as a self-evident institutional remedy, but as a reform proposal whose legitimacy depends on design, proportionality and democratic consensus.*

Keywords: *Simultaneous elections, One Nation One Election, Constitution of India, federalism, parliamentary democracy, electoral reform, governance.*